It has been two months since Haacaaluu was assassinated, and all formidable opponents of the PM were thrown into jails based on a trumped up charges. From Jawar Mohammed and Bekele Gerba to Eskinder Nega and Lidetu Ayalew, his most outspoken critics, except those in the self-governing region of Tigray, are languishing in jails for political reasons. Make no mistake – these trials are political. Once again, the law and the judicial apparatus are being weaponized by the regime to purge its political foes from the political space. What goes on before the courts in these cases is the continuation of the political battle by a legal means. The courts, rather than being independent guardians of truth and justice, are being used as mere instruments at the disposal of the gov’t.
Abiy wants to make sure that he continues to live in his garishly ornate palace (which he wants Ethiopians to view it as a model for what the country would look like under his leadership) and he seems to have come to the conclusion that he needs to get brutal if he is to avoid being ousted from his obtrusively decorated palace.
But can a dictatorship endure in today’s Ethiopia? Isn’t this steadfast political archetype of the last two centuries on the way out everywhere? Why does this gov’t think they can get the job done (whatever that is) through force and violence?
The military-run dictatorship of the Derg, one of Africa’s most brutal military dictatorships, crumbled under the relentless onslaught of liberation movements. TPLF’s dictatorship, which maintained power through a combination of violence, and the distribution of patronage through personal and ethnic networks, succumbed to the persistent protests of teeming Oromo youth. Abiy’s dictatorship, and its neo-Neftegna apparatchiks, will prove to be one of the most unstable, out of place, and untimely of dictatorships seen anywhere in the world.
Ethiopia, as a plurinational state, faces a very complex future, and it does not need a dictatorship and a return to that dejected past to chart a mutually acceptable path and a future. What is need is finding a way to work towards constitutional settlement for the nations and nationalities, and a commitment to secure that settlement in a new social contract, which hopefully lays the foundation for the state building project that has failed for so long. One way of working towards that settlement is via a process often called National Dialogue (not the one Abiy’s started after jailing all his opponents)t.
Abiy Ahmed Left and Jawar Mohammed Right
The path Ethiopia is on right now is a path to nowhere, a stride into darkness.
Release all political prisoners and return to the transitional process. This gov’t is not elected and it does not have a democratic mandate to impose a political settlement for the future.
Ethiopia faces a dangerous cycle of intensifying internal political dissent, ethnic unrest and security crackdowns, observers have warned, after a series of protests in recent weeks highlighted growing discontent with the government of Abiy Ahmed, a Nobel peace prize winner.
Many western powers welcomed the new approach of Abiy, who took power in 2018 and promised a programme of radical reform after decades of repressive one-party rule, hoping for swift changes in an emerging economic power that plays a key strategic role in a region increasingly contested by Middle Eastern powers and China. He won the peace prize in 2019 for ending a conflict with neighbouring Eritrea.
The most vocal unrest was in the state of Oromia, where there have been waves of protests since the killing last month of a popular Oromo artist and activist, Haacaaluu Hundeessaa, in Addis Ababa, the capital. An estimated 180 people have died in the violence, some murdered by mobs, others shot by security forces. Houses, factories, businesses, hotels, cars and government offices were set alight or damaged and several thousand people, including opposition leaders, were arrested.Ethiopia
Further protests last week prompted a new wave of repression and left at least 11 dead. “Oromia is still reeling from the grim weight of tragic killings this year. These grave patterns of abuse should never be allowed to continue,” said Aaron Maasho, a spokesperson for the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.
The Oromo community have long felt excluded from power and the benefits of Ethiopia’s booming economy. The Oromo protest movement gained momentum from 2015 and contributed to the appointment of Abiy, an Oromo from the ruling party, who promised democracy and prosperity for all.
“We are seeing a continuation of that movement, and also signs that the government’s response will be equally forceful. Once people are shot and arrested then that becomes a rallying cry,” said William Davison, an analyst based in Addis Ababa for the International Crisis Group.
The decision to indefinitely delay elections due later this year because of coronavirus – which has caused 600 deaths in the country of 100 million so far – has also worried diplomats and other international observers.
The protests in Oromia last week began amid claims that Jawar Mohammed, an Oromo opposition politician and one of Abiy’s most outspoken critics, was being denied medical attention in prison.
Young protesters described being “hunted down, shot in the streets” in the Oromia town of Aweday.
“Soldiers shot at us so I ran as fast as I could. I witnessed people getting shot in the back as they fled,” said Kedir, who took part in a demonstration on Tuesday.
Haacaaluu Hundeessaa performing in Addis Ababa in July 2018. He was known for his activism and political lyrics. Photograph: EPA
Aliyyi Mohammed, a 22-year-old from Hirna, was taken to hospital after being shot in the thigh on Monday. Relatives said he had been “nowhere near” the protests when injured and now feared for his safety. “There are police waiting outside the hospital … We have heard that they want to arrest him as soon as he’s recovered. We can only pray they leave him alone,” said a member of the family who requested anonymity.
Relatives of Farhan Ali, 22, claimed he had been killed by security forces after leaving his home in Dire Dawa to visit a neighbour. “Soldiers killed him in cold blood,” said Bahar Omar, a cousin. “He didn’t break the law. They shot him multiple times in the back. He died right there and had no chance.”
Officials have denied such claims. “There has been violence, but we are yet to confirm reports of any killings by state forces,” said Getachew Balcha of the Oromia region’s communication affairs office.
But claims of mistreatment by security forces are fuelling the cycle of unrest in Oromia. Graphic images of 21-year-old Durassa Lolo were widely shared on social media after relatives claimed he had been tortured in the town of Asasa by soldiers who had asked him for his name.
“My brother did nothing wrong. When they heard an Oromo-sounding name, his fate was sealed. They took him to a military camp and inflicted on him unbelievable savagery. [He] is fighting for his life in hospital. This is why there are protests. The government sees us as expendable,” Durassa’s brother, Abdisa Lolo, said.
The government says Haacaaluu was murdered by Oromo nationalist militants as part of a wider plot to derail its reform agenda. The ruling party has also suggested that its rival in the northern region of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), masterminded the conspiracy. The TPLF dominated the ruling coalition until Abiy took office. It has since joined the opposition, accusing the prime minister of planning to replace the ethnic-based federal system with a more centralised state.
Both the TPLF and Oromo nationalist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front deny involvement in either the murder or the unrest.
Government policy has also led to fallouts within the ruling party. The defence minister, Lemma Megersa, an ally turned critic of Abiy, was last week fired and placed under house arrest. State media reported Lemma’s dismissal from the ruling party being due to his “violating party discipline”.
Analysts say it was important to recognise that recent unrest has been limited to Oromia and that there was credible evidence suggesting violence over the previous months had not simply been inflicted on protesters by the security forces but also had occurred between ethnic communities.
The office of Ethiopia’s attorney general last week defended the government’s response to the unrest, saying in a statement that investigations would reflect a “commitment to human rights”.
Abel Abate Demissie, an Addis Ababa-based analyst with London’s Chatham House, said Ethiopia’s political polarisation has deep roots, with structural problems that have been insufficiently addressed under Abiy: conflicting narratives about Ethiopia’s history, an unfinished federal project and tensions over the division of power between the centre and the regions.
“Two years down the line [after his appointment], and you find every major political group is disappointed with Abiy,” he said.
America faces an epic choice …
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Largest US childrenswear retailer blames Covid for move, as employees say they are struggling to buy food after wage cuts
The largest childrenswear retailer in the US has cancelled millions of dollars worth of clothing orders from suppliers in Ethiopiabecause of the coronavirus pandemic, pushing companies into debt and leaving employees facing pay cuts.
The Children’s Place (TCP), which has more than 1,000 stores in the US and 90 around the world and had a turnover of $2bn (£1.5bn) last year, cancelled orders from Ethiopia in March and delayed payments by six months for orders completed in January and February, suppliers told the Guardian.
Ethiopian workers are the lowest paid in the global garment supply chain. According to a report by the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, the minimum wage for Ethiopian garment workers is $26 a month, compared with $95 in Bangladesh and $326 in China.
Ethiopian suppliers claim that TCP has demanded retroactive rebates on products that had been shipped before the crisis.They said the company cited the force majeureclause (which frees companies from contractual obligations in the case of certain extreme events) in its contracts as a reason not to pay, due to Covid-19.
In a statement, Gregory Poole, TCP’s chief supply chain officer, said the company had cancelled fewer than 3% of orders from Ethiopian suppliers.
Suppliers said the cancellations have had serious consequences for their businesses.
Some producers said they have been unable to pay their lenders due to the cancellations, which has left them crippled with debt after already buying raw materials and paying workers. Others have said the cut in orders was enough to wipe out their profits for the year.
One supplier told the Guardian his company had lost its credit line after losing nearly $1m because of contract cancellations.
“We are a company with 95% women workers. Some [of the workers are] mothers,” the supplier said. Asked what the company could do legally to recoup the hundreds of thousands of dollars lost, the supplier responded: “How do you fight such a big US corporation? They have endless pockets.”
Another supplier said that although TCP had started to pay back some money for the cancelled orders, the company still owed it hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The Children’s Place is one of four leading US apparel brands sourcing goods from Ethiopia, alongside PVH, JC Penney and H&M. In its annual report last year, TCP cited Ethiopia as a “key sourcing region”. The Worker Rights Consortium said at least seven factories in Ethiopia were producing clothing for TCP stores, employing about 15,000 workers.
In 2016, the Ethiopian government opened its flagship Hawassa Industrial Park to help boost Ethiopia’s economy through tax breaks for business and jobs for its growing population. Most of the country’s garment workers are young women who have migrated from poor rural areas.
But the pandemic has derailed the government’s plans. In April, the International Monetary Fund downgraded Ethiopia’s 2020 economic growth rate from 6.2% to 3.2%.
Aida*, 20, who has worked for a factory that produces clothing for TCP for three years, said her wages had been cut from $26 a month to $10 since March. She said her employers had told workers the company might go bankrupt because of the volume of lost orders.The fashion industry echoes colonialism – DfID’s scheme will subsidise it | Meg Lewis
“I am afraid I am going to lose my job because of the crisis and get expelled from my house when I can’t afford to pay my rent. Since the factory has stopped providing transportation I get up earlier and walk to work. It takes me around 50 minutes to get to the factory. The days I skip meals has become more frequent … I used to eat vegetables but now I usually consume only cornflour meals.”
Tamru*, 22, who works at the same factory, usually makes $27 a month, working nine hours a day, six days a week. He must pay for his own housing. Since orders were cut, the company stopped supplying buses to transport workers to the factories, and his wages have been cut in half. He told the Guardian that this had made buying basic food unaffordable.
“I can’t eat whenever I want to eat,” he said. “I sometimes skip dinner. I walk from home to work every day because the factory has stopped providing transport service and I can’t afford to pay for a bus. My work is so exhausting, I never sit, and the pay is very small to cover my expenses.”
Coronavirus has had a damaging effect on TCP, resulting in the temporary closure of stores and overall financial losses.
Scott Nova, executive director at the Worker Rights Consortium, said: “We understand that The Children’s Place faces real financial challenges during this time. But this just represents a small fraction of their total cancellations globally. There are other brands, like PVH and H&M that have stepped up to pay. So can TCP, and they should.”
TCP declined to address specific claims made by suppliers to the Guardian, but Poole said in the statement: “In early April, as a result of the nationwide shutdown and the global uncertainty regarding the Covid-19 pandemic, we cancelled less than 3% of our Ethiopian orders. However, after working collaboratively with our vendor partners, we have mutually agreed to take in all finished orders, have increased our Ethiopian 2020 order volume by double digits, and are current on all of our Ethiopian vendor payments.
“We have longstanding relationships with all of our Ethiopian vendor partners, we have substantially grown our business in Ethiopia every year, and we are committed to manufacturing in Ethiopia for the long term, with a specific focus on improving the working conditions and the wellbeing of Ethiopian garment workers. To that end, The Children’s Place, working with NGOs, has developed and implemented important programs.”
*Names have been changed to protect the identities of workers.
(Disclaimer: Long post, read at your own convenience)
A Situational/Contextual View of How We Made a Brutal Dictator in Ethiopia
A couple of weeks ago I adopted an old school psychology (Personality/Traits Approach) to describe Abiy Ahmed as an evil ruler emphasizing that he has dark traits at his core with examples of the malevolent behaviors he frequently exhibted in the public office. That discussion was typically focused on Abiy’s personal traits that served as a benchmark for identifying him as an evil ruler.
In this piece, I’ll adopt a modern perspective in psychology that is known as the situational/contextual perspective to look at the situations that served as springboard for Abiy Ahmed to sprung from, and the behaviors of his followers that scaffolded and held that springboard in place as he prepared to take a giant leap to a brutal dictatorship that we are living as of today.
Researches in the situational approach emphasize that a dictator leader in the making elicits maximum performance from his followers through directive behaviors (one-way communication) and supportive behaviors (two-way communication) tailoring his behaviors to his followers’ willingness, abilities and level of confidence with the desire to build and maintain strong relationships with them. With this premise as a theoretical framework, let’s consider some 15 situations/contexts that made strong and well-situated springboard for Abiy Ahmed to leap into brutal dictatorship:
Colonel Abiy Ahmed
1) His inaugural speech & first day in office: Through his inaugural speech, Abiy unmistakably cemented in the public memory that his mother’s dream of him to become the 7th King of Ethiopia became true, which most of his supports graciously accepted and applauded with few exception of dissenting views that made his remark a subject of few weeks of mockery. On the same day, as he walked into the Menelik’s palace, he boldly showed admiration and nostalgia for the past dictator emperors like Menelik and Haile Silassie I, and that performance of him bought him more supporters from those who regarded him as a unifying leader while the rest of the public chose to remain silent garnering him more confidence.
2) The Bahir Dar Stage Rant about Oromo Nationalism: In attempt to fetch greater support from the Amhara elites through bringing the contending ANDM and the nationalist NAMA supports together, Abiy chose to dismiss the idea of political movement based on nationalist perspective in which he ridiculed the Oromo Nationalism, claiming that Oromo nationalism reduced the Oromo people to a village arena and made them invisible eventhough the available evidences provide contrerary to his claim. While this maneuver yielded him considerable support from the Amhara groups, the greater majority of his supports from the Oromo remain silent with few exception of Oromo elites in abroad. This silence was marked a warmup for Abiy for another game plan or performance.
3) The removal of Lemma Megersa from Oromia and subsequent dismantling of #Team_Lemma. This maneuver of Abiy was considered as a betrayal by some Oromo elites and a book titled ‘The Hijacked Revolution’ was written about it as a signal to warn the Oromo public that Abiy is on the move of hijacking the people’s revolution. Even with this amazing whistleblower’s attempt to expose that Abiy Ahmed is engaged in illicit activities, the majority of the Oromo masses gave deaf ears to the warning and continued rallying behind him.
4) Investing millions in resorting the legacies of Oromo people’s historical enemies: Abiy’s belligerent move of poking Oromo’s injury through glorifying the past dictators like Menelik and Haile Selassie I by making brand new statues and installing it in the national palace was not met with proportional resistance as expected from the Oromo masses despite Jawar Mohammed’s and Lencho Leta’s defiance in which they declined the invitation to attend the inauguration of the statues instead travelled to Annolee to pay tribute to the Oromos massacred by the emperor Abiy chose to glorifying.
5) The training of the Republican Guard and repeated appearance in Military Fatigue: Abiy’s ambition to act as a military leader started with the training of the elite security forces, and appearing frequently in military fatigue to the public though he leads a civil administration, which is contrary to the behaviors of his predecessors who held the premiere position. This behavior was also not appropriately met with due rebuke from the follower masses.
6) The I’m Meles’s son rant at ECA meeting: Abiy’s dream of rigging an election if one takes place, and his ambition to make sure it doesn’t exist was made public during the consultation with opposition political parties’ leaders during which these leaders stressed for fair and free election to take place by mid 2020. Instead of properly address the opposition leaders demand, Abiy resorted to dismissing the urgency of the matter, and bluffed all along by boasting that he’s raised by Meles and well skilled in ballot rigging if pushed for immediate election out of his convenience. Neither the opposition political leaders nor the public met this scandalous behavior of Abiy and he simply got away with it, may be to his surprise!
7) Repeated romanticizing of the Brutal Dictator in the Horn of Africa-Isaias Afwerki: From the outset, it appeared that Abiy’s excessive bonding with the Eritrean dictator was to solicit mutual solutions to the long standing boarder crisis and reestablish healthy bilateral diplomatic relations with neighboring country. However, it turned out that Abiy was facilitating for vicariously learning the dectorial leadership style from the man how ruled his people with an iron fist for nearly 30 years. This eventually lead to the deployment of Eritrean security agents and elite commandos in the country’s capital to reinforce Abiy’s repressive measures against dissenting voices. Yet, the public lent deaf ears and blind eyes to this treasonous act.
8) The assassination attempt of Jawar Mohammed. Although this incident was instantly met with strong condemnation and wider protests by the Oromo people, Abiy overcame public anger by employing the idiosyncratic talents of the regional president, Oromia police, even Lemma Megersa that the attempt was a mistake and that they could take measures on the perpetrators. The failure to put forth well thought deterrence mechanism for similar attempts from happening led us to further crisis following the plotted murder of our prominent singer, #HaacaaluuHundessa.
9) The rant about smashing Oromummaa and breaking Oromo for thousands years. This was emerged as Abiy’s new strategy to intimidate some junior officers and cadres of the then OPDO/ODP, who showed indifference to his much adored medemer and prosperity rhetorics. Though practically Abiy has no capability to do what he meant to do against Oromummaa and Oromo people, the mere silence of the greater mass to counter his intimidation gave him a false sense of a feared and strong man who smashes anyone who rise up against his way of doing medemer and prosperity.
10) Training of the Oromia Special Forces aka Janjaweed Militias. Abiy’s outrageous move of sidelining the Oromo Police who supported the Oromo people’s cause, and deploying the newly trained Janjaweed Militias to jail, torture, kill the innocent civilians, and vandalizing their properties was not met with strong public protest or condemnation.
11) The define, defame, and destroy propaganda against the Oromo in the name of ‘Shanee’. Jawar Mohammed’s out cry to the Oromo people about this propaganda was not seriously taken from the populace, but it turned out, right in front of our eyes, to be an elimination strategy of any Oromo person or group showing defiance (actual or imagined) to Abiy’s malice.
12)Sponsoring the neo-neftagna group to wage staged and media based deregotary and defamation war against the Oromo. It was through Abiy’s support and under his watch that a group of neo-neftagna supermacists spearheaded deregatory humilation beginning right from the stage in the plalace and in his prescence. This latter grew into a wider media based defamation campaign targeting anything Oromo. Abiy used this scenario as a divide and rule strategy as he forged his path to dictatorship. This disguised behavior was not properly addressed by the Oromo masses, and served as a blessing for Abiy’s callousness.
13) Disbanding multinational parties and installment of one party system. In a major move to single handedly control the country’s politics, Abiy embarked on dissolving the nationalist political parties and traded some buy-in from the peripheries to establish his Prosperity Party. This camouflaging behavior of monopolizing the country’s politics was graciously endorsed by the follower masses.
14) Manipulation and privatization of the constitutional process: Through instrumentalizing the justice system, Abiy extended the national election indefinitely, and prepared himself to rule without mandate. This maneuver was also not met with strong condemnation from the follower populace or the general public, except some opposition political leaders and activists.
15) Huge investment to control the masses through ideologies: i) The propagation of Menelikian Rhetoric bought Abiy support from the majority of Amhara nationalist groups and Ethiopianist masses.
ii) Prosperity ideology (adopted from Prosperity Gospel) amassed him support from the Protestant religious groups.
iii) The Ilma Abbaa Gadaa Rhetoric (the claim to uphold the Gada democratic values in his leadership) -though gradually debunked-garnered him considerable support from the Oromo masses thereby creating silent majority amidst his brutal and inhumane war atrocities against the civilian and innocent Oromo people.
Therefore, here we are with the brutal dicator named Abiy Ahmed made with the character contents of past emperors, and in the image of Isaias Afwerki!
Lemma Megersa, a former close ally of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has been replaced as defence minister
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s office announced Tuesday that he was replacing his defence minister, a fellow ethnic Oromo and former close ally who has recently been openly critical of Abiy’s political reforms.
The ouster of Lemma Megersa, announced on Twitter as part of a broader cabinet reshuffle, underscores tensions between Abiy and other high-profile politicians from his Oromo ethnic group over how Ethiopia’s democratic transition should be managed.
Abiy, the winner of last year’s Nobel Peace Prize, became Ethiopia’s first Oromo leader when he was appointed prime minister in 2018 after years of anti-government protests.
He was tasked with leading the country to landmark elections which were originally scheduled for this year but have been delayed because of the coronavirus pandemic.
Many Oromos contend Abiy has not sufficiently addressed their longstanding feelings of political and economic marginalisation.
In an interview with Voice of America’s Afaan Oromo language service last November, Lemma criticised Abiy’s push to merge the coalition of ethno-regional parties which had ruled Ethiopia for three decades into a single political party known as the Prosperity Party.
Lemma, formerly Abiy’s boss when he was president of the Oromia region, also rejected Abiy’s philosophy “Medemer” (Amharic for synergy) which is aimed at uniting the country.
Lemma was widely believed to have been sidelined for months, with analysts predicting his future as defence minister was untenable.
Earlier this month the Oromia regional branch of the Prosperity Party announced Lemma had been suspended from its central and executive committees, though it was unclear if he had ever actually joined the party.
Lemma will be replaced by Kenea Yadeta, a former security official in Oromia.
Tuesday’s cabinet reshuffle also saw Abiy replace his attorney general and move the mayor of the capital Addis Ababa, Takele Uma, to mines and energy minister.
Lemma is far from the first influential Oromo politician to publicly break with Abiy.
Media mogul Jawar Mohammed has notably become one of the prime minister’s most high-profile critics and last year joined the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress.
Jawar was arrested in July for his alleged role in violence that erupted after the shooting death of popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa.
The violence left more than 200 people dead and highlighted simmering ethnic tensions throughout Oromia, which surrounds the capital Addis Ababa.
A disputed regional election plan has ratcheted up tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and its rivals in Tigray. To avert a confrontation, Tigrayan officials should press pause on election preparations and both sides should embrace dialogue to address the dispute and underlying causes.
What’s new? Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and his rivals in Tigray are on a collision course over the latter’s plan to hold regional elections in defiance of federal authority. If Tigray proceeds, Abiy’s government is ready to consider any new regional administration illegitimate.
Why does it matter? Although Abiy has ruled out military intervention, federal officials threaten other punitive measures that could lead the parties to blows. Ongoing tensions also could push Tigray to trigger constitutional secession procedures, further raising the stakes and intensifying conflict risks with Addis Ababa and Amhara region.
What should be done? To defuse the situation, Tigray should pause its election plans and Addis Ababa should embrace talks over potential compromises. Given the acrimony, mediation by continental heavyweights may be needed. Abiy should also consider backing a national dialogue to reset Ethiopia’s vexed transition.
I. Overview
Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigray region are edging toward confrontation over a disputed regional election plan. The country is already reeling from more deadly unrest after the 29 June murder of a musician regarded as a folk hero in Oromia region, the epicentre of protests that eventually brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018. Now it faces another crisis, this time pitting federal against Tigray’s authorities. Abiy has been at odds with Tigrayan elites, many of whom he has purged from government and state institutions since taking office. A June decision by the Tigray State Council to hold regional elections, defying a federal ruling that all polls should be delayed due to COVID-19, has further ratcheted up tensions. While previously threatening to take “any measures” to stop the vote, the prime minister has now ruled out military action against Tigray. To end the standoff, Tigray should pause its elections plans and Addis Ababa should embrace dialogue with Tigray to address the electoral dispute and ease the underlying causes of their destabilising acrimony.
The row over Tigray’s decision comes after the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia abandoned vote preparations in March due to the arrival of COVID-19. In June, just two days after a separate federal ruling stated that no elections could take place until nine to twelve months after federal health authorities deem the pandemic under control, the Tigray State Council announced that it would still hold its own election, scheduled between 17-20 September. In theory, it makes little or no material difference to the balance of power within Tigray whether these elections occur or not. The region’s ruling party would continue to govern even if they were deferred, and if the polls go ahead it would likely win them anyway. But the issue of whether Tigray can legally hold elections has taken on existential significance for Ethiopia. Tigray officials insist that it is their constitutional right to run polls, saying the federal decision to extend all regional governments’ terms was illegal. Federal officials, meanwhile, reject Tigray’s constitutional interpretation and so categorise its actions as unlawful. The row over Tigray’s decision comes after the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia abandoned vote preparations in March due to the arrival of COVID-19.
Underlying the argument between the federal and regional governments is a power struggle between Abiy and Tigrayan elites, once at the helm of Ethiopia’s ruling coalition that the prime minister took over when he came to power in 2018. Tigray officials feel that federal authorities are out to punish their ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), ever since Abiy assumed office and especially since the TPLF refused to merge into Abiy’s new Prosperity Party that formed in 2019. The spat has escalated in recent months, playing out via federal arrests of senior TPLF officials, federal probes into TPLF-linked companies and accusations from Abiy’s allies that the TPLF is behind a campaign of national destabilisation, including the late June assassination of Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo musician whose murder set off some of the worst intercommunal violence the country has seen during its troubled transition.
Despite Abiy’s recent statement committing to avoid military confrontation or cutting federal funds to Tigray over the election standoff, there are others in his political corner spoiling for a fight. Federal officials indicate that the election could justify a range of punitive measures against the region, which could bring the parties to blows. Such measures could also provoke Tigrayan leaders into triggering constitutional secession clauses in response to what they see as a steady erosion of their self-rule rights within Ethiopia’s federation. This step would be deeply provocative not only to the federal government, but also to Tigray’s southern neighbour, Amhara region, whose elites say they would fight to gain control of territories that Tigray would take with it if it were to secede. Any armed confrontation over this or other flashpoints, and federal involvement in them, would test the national army’s cohesion, given the large numbers of mid-ranking Tigrayan officers, some of whose loyalties may be to the region.
Given the seriousness of all this, respected African statesmen and Ethiopian elders, including religious leaders, should seek to coax the parties away from conflict. Ethiopian governments have historically brooked no outside intervention and Abiy may bristle at the idea of external meddling in domestic affairs, but a continental heavyweight could make a difference. The African Union’s chair, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who should have both sides’ ears, could work with other African leaders to bring them to the table. The aim should be to persuade Tigray to pause its elections, pending constitutional interpretation from the House of Federation, the upper house of parliament, on the legality of such a vote, and press the parties to begin dialogue on steps to address their rift. If Tigray proceeds with a vote before the House gives its opinion or in defiance of it, Addis Ababa should accept this decision, as long as the region agrees to hold another poll when the rest of the country does, thereby reducing the duration of this irregular arrangement. Abiy should stick to his pledge not to intervene militarily.
More broadly, it is time for the prime minister and other Ethiopian leaders to give serious consideration to a national dialogue. Abiy and his aides are unenthusiastic, given their conviction that the opposition has already been given unprecedented opportunities to voice their grievances since 2018. Yet the country’s multiple, growing and interrelated fault lines have made such a national dialogue more necessary than ever. Such a process should aim at resetting Ethiopia’s vexed transition and ironing out bitter divisions among its most powerful regions as well as between supporters and opponents of the country’s ethnic federalist system.
II. The Election Dispute
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has added complexity and tension to Ethiopia’s already fragile transition. In March, after the pandemic struck, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia abandoned preparations for a general election that had been set for 29 August. Parliament approved a five-month state of emergency the following month. On 10 June, the House of Federation, the upper house of parliament tasked with constitutional interpretation and populated by delegates from regional councils, almost all dominated by Prime Minister Abiy’s ruling Prosperity Party, decided that elections would be held nine to twelve months after health authorities determine that the pandemic is sufficiently controlled. Two days later, the Tigray State Council, the only such council in which the Prosperity Party does not hold sway, announced that it would nonetheless proceed with regional elections to determine who sits on that council. Delaying polls due to the pandemic was arguably a necessary step, but deadly unrest in Oromia in early July demonstrates the potential dangers in Abiy’s doing so without consulting his rivals
The tussle over electoral timetables comes after opposition voices expressed frustration at what they see as the prime minister’s unilateral manner in bringing about an “indefinite” suspension of national elections.Parts of the opposition, especially in Abiy’s home state Oromia, were instrumental in bringing him to power and resented being shut out of decision-making, especially after the government extended its own term due to COVID-19. They want a formal role or at least for Abiy to consult them more regularly during the interim period, at a minimum over election-related issues; they also seek an electoral timetable that is neither open-ended nor decided by Abiy appointees.
Delaying polls due to the pandemic was arguably a necessary step, but deadly unrest in Oromia in early July demonstrates the potential dangers in Abiy’s doing so without consulting his rivals. The violence was triggered by the murder of Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo musician. But even before his killing, two main Oromo opposition parties had warned that the situation in the region was combustible, largely as a result of the Abiy government’s unilateral decision to extend its term. Despite the TPLF and other opponents urging the federal government to adopt a more inclusive approach in managing the election delay, the administration moved against opponents in response to the July turbulence, arresting 7,000 people, including much of the Oromo nationalist opposition leadership.
The most vociferous objections to the House of Federation’s vote delay came from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which calls it unconstitutional. The TPLF announced that it would proceed with the vote in Tigray, which it is set to hold between 17-20 September.Without asking for a formal ruling from the House of Federation, the ruling Tigray party declared that self-rule rights granted by Article 39 of the constitution are non-negotiable and supersede the National Electoral Board’s role overseeing votes. It insists that any election delay beyond the constitutional deadline, even given the pandemic and the House of Federation’s decision on the matter, breaches the constitution. Further entrenching the dispute, Tigray established its own election commission in mid-July after the national board declared on 24 June that Tigray’s government lacked the mandate to hold a vote. Addis Ababa’s rhetoric has at times been belligerent.
Federal officials also believe that the law is on their side. Article 55 of Ethiopia’s constitution states that the federal parliament enforces “political rights established by the constitution and electoral laws and procedures”. The 10 June House of Federation decision explicitly stated that it applied to regional administrations as well, while the constitution also says the National Electoral Board runs all votes. In a late July letter sent to Tigray’s government, the House of Federation reiterated that holding a regional election would violate the constitution, and thus by implication that any new Tigray administration sworn in after such an election would be illegitimate.
Addis Ababa’s rhetoric has at times been belligerent. Federal officials in June claimed that the government would stop the vote and would consider any newly elected Tigray government illegitimate. Some officials asserted that they would reassess financial grants to Tigray, which amount to half the region’s budget, if it were to go ahead with its election. In late 2019, a federal official told Crisis Group that the government had a case then for interrupting transfers to Tigray because the region was allegedly using the money to fund a regional security apparatus hostile to federal rule. Other officials went so far as to hint at military action. According to one interviewed in July: “If they [the TPLF] continue to undermine the existing constitution and government structure, then we will do whatever it takes to stop them doing that. The federal government will take all necessary measures”. In May, Abiy himself said:
Unconstitutional attempts to undertake illegal elections will result in harm to the country and the people. Therefore, the government will be forced to take any measures to assure the safety of the people and the country.
In late July, the prime minister issued a helpful and forceful clarification, characterising the idea of military action against the region as “insane talk” and stressing that he would not punish Tigray with budget cuts. This clarification has not assuaged the concerns of Tigrayan leaders, however. Many among them read Abiy’s May statement as a threat to send in troops to stop the vote and dismiss his late July remarks as a public display of peaceful intent on the part of a prime minister whose actions and allies – they maintain – are pushing the parties toward confrontation and belie his medemer (roughly translated as “synergy”) doctrine preaching unity and peace. Tigrayan officials say their party and regional government still face sustained pressure from Addis Ababa, and maintain that holding the election is a matter of principle.
III. The TPLF vs. Abiy
Underlying the rancour between the Prosperity Party and TPLF is a power struggle pitting Abiy and his allies against Tigrayan elites. Once at the helm of ethno-nationalist rebel groups that overthrew a centralising military regime in 1991, the TPLF was key to building an ethnic federalist system that established semi-autonomous units along ethno-linguistic lines. It spearheaded the four-party ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which held power for a quarter-century until 2019, overseeing rapid economic growth but severely restricting civil liberties. The TPLF entrenched itself in federal security institutions and its top officials managed important state-controlled economic sectors. Opponents criticise its conduct in these years, pointing to its suppression of civil and self-determination rights even as it presented itself as the guardian of autonomy for groups downtrodden before 1991. Others oppose the ethnic federalist system the TPLF instituted, saying it fosters communal division by devolving power to regions organised according to ethnicity.
The protests that brought Abiy to power and steps he has taken since to weaken the TPLF form the backdrop to today’s dispute. Beginning in 2015, protesters in Oromia and Amhara, the country’s two most populous regions, rose up against perceived TPLF hegemony and state repression. They were supported by ruling elites from those two regions, who outmanoeuvred the TPLF to instal Abiy as prime minister in April 2018. Amid economic and political liberalisation, in June 2018 the premier removed the TPLF head of national intelligence Getachew Assefa – now wanted by federal prosecutors though still serving in the TPLF’s politburo – and gradually ousted all federal ministers belonging to the party. These moves were popular with many Ethiopians who blamed the TPLF for the previous authoritarian system’s oppression.
TPLF leaders chafe at their treatment. They accuse Addis Ababa of unduly purging Tigrayan civil servants and depict federal prosecutions against Tigrayan officials for graft and rights abuses as unfair, insofar as ruling elites from all regions engaged in such behaviour during the EPRDF era. As they see it, these measures reflect a broader effort to blame the TPLF for all Ethiopia’s woes. They point in particular to the accusation levelled by federal officials against the TPLF for killing Hundessa, which they dismiss as a “flat-out lie”. They say mobs have killed and displaced Tigrayans in Oromia and Amhara partly because of the political atmosphere created by Abiy. The TPLF’s decision not to join Abiy’s new Prosperity Party, which he pulled together with his allies in December 2019 to replace the EPRDF, on the grounds that its unitary structure would undermine hard-won regional autonomy, represents a significant crack in Ethiopia’s political edifice. The move made the TPLF’s 38 lawmakers the sole opposition bloc in the federal parliament while Tigray is the only region not run by the Prosperity Party. The protests that brought Abiy to power and steps he has taken since to weaken the TPLF form the backdrop to today’s dispute.
Increasingly angry relations between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, thus colour the election dispute. In itself, if Tigray’s government were to cancel elections for its state council, it would not matter to the regional balance of power, as the TPLF would continue to control the regional administration. Nor would Addis lose out materially if it allowed the elections to go forward – the TPLF would win and continue to rule. That both sides have stuck to their positions on the elections has less to do with the polls themselves than with broader issues of power. For Tigray leaders, it is about resisting erosion of the regional autonomy granted by the constitution. They are determined to stop any such change because they, and other ethnic federalism supporters, suspect that Abiy seeks to centralise power in Addis over time. For the federal government and for the TPLF’s opponents, it is about Tigray’s blatant defiance of federal authority. Giving way, they feel, would set a dangerous and unwelcome precedent.
IV. The Spectre of Conflict?
The prospect of imminent armed conflict, which was looming as a potential reaction to a Tigray vote, has receded. Abiy’s statement ruling out military intervention certainly helped. There are also good reasons why the federal government would hesitate before sending in troops: the army is stretched thin, facing major domestic challenges, notably in Oromia, where an insurgency simmers, and in the multi-ethnic Southern Nations region where groups demand their own regions. Further, tensions have risen with Egypt and Sudan due to the Nile dispute. With all these other worries, it is hard to imagine the federal army taking on Tigray’s security forces – which Mekelle has considerably reinforced in the last year, to federal officials’ alarm. For its part, Mekelle appears confident in its military capabilities, asserting that its security measures are defensive. On 20 July, TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael said, “Preparations are about putting our people on high alert. The conflict has reached its extreme edge”. He added that the confrontation was already in effect a “war without bullets”.
But deep concerns persist. First, and despite Abiy’s recent conciliatory noises, some government officials appear keen to use other punitive legal and administrative measures to keep the pressure on Mekelle. Arguably, they already began doing so in July. Federal security forces arrested two TPLF officials whom they accuse of assisting terrorism. The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority also tried to take Tigray state television off the airwaves for allegedly fanning unrest. Federal authorities have meanwhile launched probes of TPLF-linked companies while withdrawing government houses and vehicles from former TPLF federal officials. Notwithstanding Abiy’s promise to the contrary, top ruling-party officials have warned that they could still impose budget cuts on Tigray. Some Tigrayan officials fear that federal authorities could also interrupt power and telecommunication services to the region. Although any such action certainly would be preferable to armed intervention, it nonetheless would fuel Tigrayan anger and deepen the divide between Addis Ababa and Mekelle.
Secondly, and relatedly, actions by either side provoke rash decisions with unforeseen consequences. “They are playing Russian roulette”, a veteran regional observer told Crisis Group. “They are trapped in their own narratives and the depth of ill feeling means they are not talking to one another. It is a small step from there to a conflict that will worsen the chronic crisis the country faces if parties across the board do not step back”.For instance, if Tigray at some point were to trigger constitutional secession provisions, it would not only further fuel tensions between Addis Ababa and Mekelle but could also quickly escalate into conflict with neighbouring Amhara region, as many Amhara claim territory that is now part of Tigray. The federal government may wish to avoid military intervention, but a Tigray-Amhara showdown would likely drag it in. Hostility between the federal government and Tigray could also have regional implications.
Tensions between Amhara and Tigray have been brewing. TPLF leaders believe that Abiy has asked Temesgen Tiruneh, Amhara’s president and Abiy’s former national security adviser, to “literally declare war” on their region. Temesgen said his region planned to retrieve lands the TPLF annexed as part of a “political conspiracy”. Road closures by anti-Tigray groups on the main routes between Addis Ababa and Mekelle that the federal authorities have done little to halt had already heightened Tigrayan grievances, deepening the sense within the TPLF that they face a hostile federal government.
Needless to say, a military confrontation would be catastrophic. So far, the armed forces have remained united despite several shocks, including a military security guard’s June 2019 killing of the Tigrayan chief of staff. But a sudden outbreak of fighting involving Tigray and the federal authorities, or Tigray and Amhara, could undo military cohesion. Tigray officers hold positions throughout the armed forces in different parts of the country; some might prove more loyal to their region than to federal authorities. Tigrayan elements also are present in their home state in the north, where they could be more likely to break and join up with Tigray regional forces.
Hostility between the federal government and Tigray could also have regional implications. Already, it has infected Ethiopia’s peace deal with Eritrea. Senior Tigrayans believe the rapprochement is tantamount to an alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara against the TPLF. After initially welcoming the 2018 thaw with their neighbour, TPLF leaders criticised it, claiming President Isaias Afwerki was motivated by anti-TPLF enmity stemming partly from the devastating 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war when the TPLF was at the helm of Ethiopia’s EPRDF coalition. Eritrea’s international border, which primarily abuts Tigray on the Ethiopian side, remains heavily fortified. Some TPLF sympathisers fear that Ethiopian federal authorities could, under certain circumstances, ally with Eritrean forces against Mekelle.
V. A Necessary Rethink
Both sides’ positions hinder resolution of the crisis: the TPLF has vowed to hold the vote; the federal government is using confrontational pressure tactics to weaken Tigray’s ruling party. These stances also inhibit dialogue. Because a number of federal officials believe that the TPLF’s election plan is the latest in a series of ploys it has pursued since it lost power to destabilise the country, they equate negotiations with ill-judged appeasement. For its part, the TPLF has rejected bilateral talks with Abiy, instead calling for a comprehensive national dialogue to address the country’s faltering transition.The federal government has given no indication that it thinks such a process is necessary, presenting itself as a champion of reform undermined by disgruntled, irresponsible actors such as TPLF elements.
The parties’ rival perspectives and animosity are jeopardising the country’s future. The Prosperity Party is formally in a strong position, given its control of parliament, but opponents question its legitimacy given its roots in a discredited ruling coalition. Its authority is set to become more tenuous after its original five-year governing mandate ends on 10 October. The TPLF’s political standing is arguably weaker as it has few allies outside Tigray; indeed, its legitimacy is questioned even in Tigray due to a range of issues including TPLF repression. Arena, a major opposition Tigrayan group, plans to boycott the vote (along with the Prosperity Party).
Finding a middle ground will be difficult given the competing principles held by the two sides – Tigray’s belief that its right to hold autonomous regional elections stems from its right to self-rule, on one hand; the central government’s conviction that no regional state can defy the constitution and parliament’s decision on electoral matters, on the other. Third-party mediation will likely be needed. Religious leaders and other elders visited Tigray in June to see if they could help; they may be able to encourage both sides to adopt more conciliatory stances. Still, given the stakes, the parties’ entrenched positions and the atmosphere’s toxicity, a weightier arbiter may also be required. Prominent African statesmen with strong ties to both the TPLF and Abiy could play this role. They will need to be particularly skillful, given Ethiopian governments’ traditional allergy to outside intervention. Ethiopia’s outside partners, notably the EU and U.S., should encourage Abiy to shy away from the Prosperity Party’s unilateralism and embrace a more inclusive approach to governing.
The African Union chairperson, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, could play the role, if necessary in association with other continental leaders. The statesmen could start by encouraging Abiy and his administration to avoid provocative measures, including cuts to Tigray’s finances (let alone military intervention), and to engage in a dialogue with Tigray to discuss possible electoral compromises and steps to mend the rift.
In parallel, they could press Mekelle to pause its election plans as a response to Abiy’s recent overtures and to express its grievances exclusively through legal channels. Finding a middle ground on the electoral standoff will be no easy task given the parties’ opposing views. But some ideas could be considered: insofar as the TPLF is making a constitutional and legal case for its right to hold the vote on schedule, its leaders should first exhaust all avenues for legal redress. They could, for example, appeal to the House of Federation, the upper house of parliament tasked with constitutional interpretation, for a view on whether regions have the right to run a vote. That chamber is packed with Prosperity Party delegates, so the TPLF will be understandably sceptical of its chances of receiving a fair hearing – though, given the stakes, that is precisely what the body ought to do to defuse a looming and damaging confrontation.
Assuming this tactic fails – because Tigray does not take this route or because it proceeds in defiance of a negative view from the House of Federation – Tigray’s government could agree to hold a second regional poll simultaneously with the rest of the country. Abiy’s government arguably could live with this approach, as it would substantially shorten the period during which Tigray has a government that it considers illegitimate.
Given the state of Ethiopia’s transition, a broader effort may well be necessary. As Crisis Group has advocated in the past, and as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights also has suggested, sustained dialogue among Ethiopia’s political elites has become critical given the multiple, interconnected fault lines in the country’s politics. Although Abiy appears to regard such a dialogue warily, it is likely the most realistic and viable way to reconcile the diverse visions for the country’s future, notably on how to balance power between the centre and state governments and whether to modify the ethnic basis of administrative units. Talks could start by focusing on immediate priorities, such as the electoral timetable, paving the way for subsequent discussions on deeper-seated rifts, including over autonomy demands by groups in the south, competing Amhara and Oromo nationalist activism, and a simmering Oromo insurgency.
Such a dialogue inevitably would be highly contentious given the divisiveness of the issues and today’s political polarisation. To mitigate risks of it collapsing in recriminations or worse, it likely would need to be organised by respected, independent civil society actors and be preceded by intensive preparatory work. But at this point, given the accumulating sources of disagreement, a careful effort to create a new consensus on the path forward seems timely.
Ethiopia’s outside partners, notably the EU and U.S., should encourage Abiy to shy away from the Prosperity Party’s unilateralism and embrace a more inclusive approach to governing. They should simultaneously push the TPLF to halt its provocative rhetoric toward the prime minister; request a formal opinion from the House of Federation on the constitutional dispute, as a sign of faith in federal institutions (and, if it insists on going forward with its regional election, agree to hold another together with the rest of the country when it is held); and embrace dialogue with the Prosperity Party on how to narrow the gaps between them.
VI. Conclusion
The recent outbreak of violence in Oromia sounded a serious warning regarding Ethiopia’s political transition; any significant deterioration in the central government’s relations with Tigray could pose a threat to the integrity of the federal state itself. Both sides ought to take a step back. Tigray’s elites cleave to the position that self-rule gives them the absolute right to hold regional elections regardless of the federal authorities’ stance. The federal government asserts that the constitution prohibits Tigray from proceeding no matter the regional government’s wishes. They both could be headed toward a cliff. Tigray’s elites should understand that their electoral gambit is hazardous. Abiy, both as prime minister of Ethiopia and as Nobel laureate, should assume the moral high ground, translate his conciliatory words into action and offer a meaningful olive branch to the opposition, including his prime antagonists from the TPLF.
Oromia Media Network was a rare non-Amharic voice in Ethiopia’s media landscape. That is why its bureau was shutdown.
(Ethiopian Insight) — Oromia Media Network (OMN) is an independent media enterprise established in the U.S. six and a half years ago. Its stated mission is producing original and citizen-driven news and stories on Oromia and Ethiopia. The network is financed and operated by an extensive network of grassroots movements and the wider diaspora.
Girma Gutema, center, with, to his left, Lidetu Ayalew, and Jawar Mohammed in the OMN studio.
Among its early successes, OMN successfully guided the peaceful struggle of Oromo youth–the Qeerroo—that propelled Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018. In a move that history may record as ironic, OMN became the victim of its own success, when Abiy’s “reformist” government cracked down on the media house following the assassination of Oromo artist and rights activist Hachalu Hundessa on 29 June.
Two days after Hachalu’s killing, security forces raided and effectively shut down the OMN operation in the capital, Finfinne, the indigenous Oromo name for Addis Ababa. The premises were illegally searched, staff members detained, the organisation’s bank accounts blocked, and computers and broadcast equipment seized.
After establishing itself in exile as a Pan-Oromo voice—bringing stories from Oromia to the world and vice versa for more than four years—OMN was warmly welcomed by millions when it returned home in August 2018, particularly at the official event organized at the Millennium Hall. The move created such an excitement within the international community that the 26th World Press Freedom Day celebration was held in Ethiopia in recognition of the country’s bold move in opening up the free media landscape.
OMN had to replicate its U.S. operation to get established as OMN-Finfinne in Ethiopia (henceforth referred to as OMN), but maintained a close working relationship with its mother company, the Minnesota-based OMN. The government swiftly offered support, particularly in cutting bureaucratic red tape during registration and licensing. OMN’s working relations with the country’s media watchdog organization, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA), began well, but soon soured due to political interference, both from the Prime Minister’s Office and from other detractor groups within the media establishment that may have viewed it as a threat to their control of the dominant narrative.
Skewed landscape
Ethiopia’s tightly-controlled media machinery has historically been defined by its imperialist slant. The direction of flow of news stories and agendas has always followed the route of the imperial march—from north-to-south! That is to say, elitist media narratives have always been set in the perspectives and language of the Abyssinians, whose wilful indifference to issues of justice and equality for the peoples of the wider south continues to this day, adding more layers onto the edifices constructed within the Ethiopian state to preserve their dominant status.
Hence, OMN was an ‘alien’ star beaming a light onto a “black hole” within the stellar constellation of Ethiopia’s historically inequitable media universe. It therefore had to be snuffed out.
What’s more, just weeks before the crackdown on OMN, it was reported that there are 30+ television and 60+ radio stations operating in Ethiopia with legal licenses. Most are based in Oromia’s capital Finfinne, but only a few of them use languages other than Amharic. To be precise, only four, including the state-owned Oromia Broadcasting Network, broadcast in the Oromo language—Afaan Oromoo.
The regulator, EBA, allowed this to happen in the heart of Oromia—a decision that could reasonably be taken as an act of imposing cultural imperialism, if not an outright linguistic genocide against the indigenous Oromo people of the area. OMN was erased from this historically unjust media firmament simply because it stood out as an ‘alien —an ‘alien’ that would be unimaginable in any country that maintains even a shred of press freedom. But, alas, this is Ethiopia.
Just as Al Jazeera’s initial mission in 2006 was to counteract the global monopoly held by western news outlets over the media narrative—that flows from northern to southern hemisphere—OMN challenged the historical biases and linguistic domination that are the hallmarks of Ethiopia’s mostly state-run media, flowing in pretty much same geographic direction. By boldly bringing to the fore stories and perspectives from Ethiopia’s diverse south, OMN provided a welcome alternative to the ‘everything’s wonderful’ picture painted by establishment media. And by so doing, OMN not only shone a light on the long-stifled quests, stories and narratives of Ethiopia’s historically subjugated southern peoples, the Oromo included, it also shook the historically biased media cabal to its core.
In all, not a bad record of achievement during the brief time OMN was permitted to operate from within the country.
Incendiary interview
And here is where the probable cause for the recent assassination of the popular Oromo artist and rights activist Hachalu Hundessa comes in. In his interview on the OMN, Hachalu had spoken about the Oromo understanding of who Emperor Menelik II was. In this telling, Menelik II was a medieval-era-styled 19th century feudal ruler who founded the Ethiopian empire by waging some of Africa’s most brutal wars of conquest and subjugation against many of the indigenous peoples, including the Oromo, in what is today southern Ethiopia.
Historical accounts of the human cost of the conquest written by foreign observers, including the emperor’s own Russian advisor Alexander Bulatovich, told that Menelik II committed crimes of genocidal proportions on some of the linguistic and cultural groups, using modern weapons provided by his European and Russian “Christian friends” from 1880 to 1900.
For instance, Bulatovich, a devout admirer who accompanied Menelik II’s army battalions during these wars of colonial conquest, wrote in his 1900 book titled “Ethiopia Through Russian Eyes” — that the Gimira people were on the verge of total extinction due to the war; but were spared after “his majesty, the emperor” ordered his army commanders to stop killing the remaining Gimira as “they shall be hunted down and caught to be sold as slaves”. Bulatovich wrote that Menelik II’s war of conquest had exterminated about 80 percent of the Gimira and 50 percent of the Oromo populations by that time.
Another book by a foreign observer, the French Catholic missionary Martial De Salviac, who had travelled extensively across the Oromo country, appears to precisely corroborate Bulatovich’s account. De Salviac’s 1901 book, “The Oromo: An Ancient People: Great African Nation” reports that of the 10 million Oromo population he estimated at the time, five million were killed in Menelik II’s war of conquest. These two independent foreign sources suggest what in another time and place would be called a genocide against the Oromo by Menelik II’s invading army, which “reduced the Oromo population by half”, to use Alexander Bulatovich’s words.
Historical accounts
These historical accounts resonate well with a compelling argument made by the Israeli historian Yuval Harari in his best-selling book “Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind”. Harari argues that building and maintaining an empire often required the slaughter of large populations and the oppression of everyone who was left out. Harari notes that the standard toolkit in building an empire includes war, enslavement, deportation, and genocide.
“When the Romans invaded Scotland in 83 AD, they were met with fierce resistance from local Caledonian tribes, and reacted by laying waste to the country,” Harari writes. “In reply to the Roman peace offers, the chieftain Calgacus called the Romans ‘the ruffians of the world’, and said that ‘to plunder, slaughter and robbery, they give the lying name of empire, they make a desert and call it peace”. It is perhaps worth noting that, in a rare interview with a local radio station, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said Harari’s book is among his favorites.
In his fateful interview with the OMN, Hachalu made a casual comment about the statue of Emperor Menelik II that stands in downtown Finfinne, suggesting that it is inevitable that the genocidal emperor’s statue would eventually be taken down in a city that is the capital of both Oromia federal state and Ethiopia’s federal government, as well as headquarters of the African Union. Hachalu’s comment came amidst of a globally heating up wave of protests that has witnessed statues of imperialist leaders and slave traders being torn down.
Historians like Harold G. Marcus regard Menelik II as the “greatest slave entrepreneur” of his time, who expropriated 10 percent of all his captives from southern Ethiopia into slavery. In line with this, in a paper he published on the journal of African Economic History, Charles W. McClellan wrote that “while some of the slaves were deployed in the imperial gibbi(Menelik II’s palace), many others were exported to slave markets in Egypt, Arabia and east Africa, providing an important source of income for the government of emperor Menelik II”.
Hachalu’s offhand comment infuriated the falsely named “Ethiopianist” establishment, which exercises near absolute control over Ethiopia’s historical narrative. The establishment portrays Menelik II as a benevolent king, if not saint, who founded the “holy country” called Ethiopia, through “holy wars” of conquest. To dare to mention the feudal emperor’s genocidal deeds and suggest that his statue should be removed from Oromia’s capital is tantamount to trying to destroy their “emiye Ethiopia”. Measured by this yardstick, Hachalu’s comment was treasonous.
It should be underscored here that this viscerally violent and pre-political “Ethiopianist” group was resurrected and essentially emboldened not just by Abiy’s nostalgic imperialist rhetoric about the “great Ethiopia” of the past, which never existed anyway, but also by some of the practical measures he took in his “palace renovation project” that were offensive to many southern peoples.
A day after Hachalu’s comment was broadcast, social media erupted with calls for his immediate murder—also see some of the comments written under OMN Facebook and YouTube pages in the days after the interview’s online publication. Two days later, PM Abiy appeared to indirectly criticize Hachalu, saying “only historians, not ordinary folks [like Hachalu] should make comments on the history of Ethiopia”. This statement, at a totally unrelated event to inaugurate a new bakery, can even be viewed as incitement against Hachalu.
About a month after Hachalu was assassinated, a group of young men in the capital came out in ecstasy to the street celebrating the killing of artist Hachalu, jubilantly chanting “Hachalu is dead, Jawar will be next”. On the same day, however, another youth group in the streets of the city spared Jawar from death via their rather lenient slogan “Jawar rots in jail”. In that fateful interview he had with OMN, Hachalu also told to the journalist that he has long been enduring death threats and other forms of intimidations including physical attacks from such “proud Ethiopians” every time he drives in the city.
Hijacked revolution
Prime Minister Abiy’s attitude toward Hachalu’s dissent had previously been documented. In a book titled “The Hijacked Revolution” written by an anonymous author (pen name: Mudhin Siraj) and published about a year before Hachalu’s assassination—on page 109 of the book, the author recounts how Hachalu was summoned to the prime minister’s office for a ten-minute lecture. It was not a dialogue, but a stern ‘executive order’ in which Abiy told Hachalu in no uncertain terms that:
“…the Oromo political struggle is over. The country is now being led by an Oromo Prime Minister and, therefore, you shouldn’t dare to produce any music work which opposes my government. If you obey this strict order, we can fulfil all your material needs. But if you defy, I will not tolerate you even for a single day. Whether you like it or not, I [Abiy Ahmed] will remain leader of this country for at least the next ten years”.
As I am writing this piece, it has come to my attention that Abiy’s government has concocted a ridiculously amateurish video suggesting there is some link between Hachalu’s cold-blooded murder and two powerful Oromo opposition political groups (Oromo Federalist Congress [OFC] and Oromo Liberation Front [OLF]) and an independent, influential Oromo media house (OMN). This amateurishly doctored drama draws a fictitious triangle that purports to connect these three Oromo organizations that Abiy’s government considers its sworn opponents. The people in Oromia/Ethiopia should reject this laughable disinformation ploy; and I believe they have.
Since the day the OMN headquarters in the capital was shut down, all state-owned media and those affiliated with the ruling party have been waging a sustained propaganda campaign against the OMN. Their reason? OMN did a LIVE broadcast as Hachalu’s fans and supporters turned out in their thousands to accompany his body in the early morning hours of 30 June. But certainly, given the artist’s massive influence in Oromia and the entire country, it must have been odd for any Ethiopian media to ignore the story and come out criticizing what OMN did on that day. But alas, this is Ethiopia.
Prosperity propaganda
Plus, we see these days the government propaganda machines and affiliated detractors accusing OMN of conspiring with the propagandists’ own former master and ideological soulmate, the TPLF. The irony here is that some of these propaganda outlets like Fana Broadcasting Corporate, Walta Media and Communication Corporate are themselves the creations of the TPLF. Anyone who knows anything about OMN knows it would never have anything to do with the TPLF, or any other political party for that matter. The propagandists can choke on their words.
Furthermore, we have received credible information from within Prosperity Party circles over the last two years, that Amhara elements of the party have repeatedly demanded that the government should crackdown on the OMN and other popular Oromo entities like the OLF and OFC. And indeed, we knew this could perhaps come one day. It has long been a sticking point in internal political conversations between the Amhara and Oromo elements within the Prosperity Party, and we were anticipating the crackdown coming, especially if the balance of power tilts towards the former.
It should therefore be clearly stated here that the government’s move to shut down OMN’s headquarters in Finfinne and launch attacks against the OLF and OFC leadership is a political decision that has nothing to do with “upholding the rule of law”, as the state’s propaganda machine wants us to believe.
It is also worth noting that while the OMN and towering Oromo artists and activists like Hachalu have been sacrificing so much to save the Ethiopian empire from itself, Abiy and his “Ethiopianist” cabal are unyielding in pursuit of their counter-productive project of saving their “emiye Ethiopia” from the Oromo and the “other” peoples of the wider south. Will they be successful? The jury is still out.
Leading OMN
OMN was established as an activist entity aiming to offer extensive coverage of Oromo news and stories suppressed or ignored by state-run outlets and other interest groups in Ethiopia’s media industry. By so doing, it has developed a reputation for grassroots activism, aspiring to help mobilize Oromos in their quest for democracy, justice and equality in Ethiopia.
When I took over as Executive Director in December 2019, part of my plan was to steer OMN’s structural evolution toward more professionalism and independence. In pursuit of those goals, we devised a series of steps aimed at re-designing the organizational structure and capacity building.
The first order of business was to de-couple the organization from the shadows of my predecessor, the influential former executive director Jawar Mohammed, who had chosen to enter party politics. At that time, a commission established by the prior leadership had developed a valuable five-year strategic plan that laid out the 3Ps of OMN—passion, performance and professionalism. To broaden the audience base, the network had engaged with rights activists and intellectuals from the south, so much so that any casual visitor at office could feel OMN was a home for the perspectives of Ethiopia’s diverse nations and nationalities. And therefore, it wasn’t difficult to see the increasing influence that OMN commanded within Ethiopia’s media community, even while operating in a hostile environment marked by intimidation from the government and other interest groups.
Public service
In a multi-ethnic country like Ethiopia where over 75 distinct languages are spoken, the successful containment and control of the deadly COVID-19 virus requires a multidisciplinary approach and using as many languages as possible to communicate vital health information to the various linguistic and cultural groups. OMN’s multi-linguistic strategy in the pandemic public information campaign was widely applauded. Our unique track record of accomplishment is on display for anyone to see and judge.
One key point should be highlighted here: It is a matter of public record that no other media house, public or private, managed to regularly bring together, on a single table, teams of high-profile experts from a multitude of health science fields. Among them were epidemiologists, infectious disease specialists, medical anthropologists, virologists, pharmaceutical/medical supply system specialists, pharmaco-economists, health systems managers, community health workers, pharma/health technologists, preventive medicine specialists and others to inform and educate the public about the collective effort required to effectively fight the spread of the coronavirus. OMN also employed 18 Ethiopian languages, including sign language, in disseminating WHO’s vital health information as part of its fight against COVID-19. Certainly, no media in the country has been as multilingual and multidisciplinary as this in educating the public about the danger we face.
The big question
Indulging in a scholarly debate on the pitfalls of the barbaric political project called empire was not the objective of this piece. But this moment presents a unique opportunity. As Harari wrote in his aforementioned book, empires throughout history have crushed threats and rebellions with an iron fist; and when its day comes, a frustrated and sinking empire has always used all its might to save itself, usually collapsing into chaos and carnage. But as Harari argues, history has taken a different course since the collapse of the European empires—particularly since 1945 when the British Empire started falling apart as its colonies across the globe were liberated one by one — most of them without violence.
The current Ethiopian state has a blood-stained history down to its imperial roots. Its first constitution, written in 1931, boldly described it as an “Empire State”. Its territories and subjects were all “possessions of the emperor”. Ever since, Ethiopians across the board have waged bitter struggles — both political and military — to break the yoke of imperial oppression and transform the empire into a republic of and by the people. During all these times, Ethiopia has sustained the shocks of two major revolutions (1974 and 1991) and also a ‘peaceful internal political coup’ spurred on by powerful protests by Oromo Qeerroo that ultimately propelled Abiy to power in March 2018.
Now the question is, in light of Ethiopia’s past, and the failure of Abiy’s much anticipated “reformist” government to address the chronic contradictions of the historically imperialist Ethiopian state, will the forces struggling to keep Abiy in the the palace step aside peacefully in keeping with the precedent set by other post-1945 collapsing empires? Or, will the country descend into chaos and anarchy, as was the rule during the pre-1945 period?
Ethiopia’s delicate transition is under severe strain. A ferocious burst of communal violence in July, touched off by the murder of a popular Oromo singer, which claimed some 160 lives, underscored the grave conflict risks the populous Horn of Africa nation faces.
From Left: Defense Minister Lemma Megeressa, former chairman of ODP; opposition politician Jawar Mohammed, in prison; and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during the latter’s visit to the U.S. shorty after he assumed power.
Addis Abeba, August 13/2020 – The unrest in Oromia is complex. Long-festering grievances, discontent with PM Abiy’s policies and a deepening fracturing of the Oromo elite, have combined to create a volatile situation.
The escalating divisions, factionalism and contest for supremacy in Oromia packs enough destabilizing power to upend PM Abiy’s transition.
Urgent steps must be taken to mend the intra-Oromo elites’ rift, improve inter-ethnic relations, and put regional and national politics on a less combustible course.
A mystery assassination
The assassination of Hachalu Hundessa triggered a bout of violence and protest, the worst since PM Abiy came to power in April 2018. A week of communal clashes in Addis Abeba, the capital, and in Oromia, left some 160 people dead, according to numbers provided by government officials. Protests engulfed much of Oromia and spread quickly to several cities with large Ethiopian diaspora communities in North America and Europe.
Businesses owned by non-Oromos were looted and shops torched. The government imposed a curfew, shut down the Internet, rounded up dozens of opposition leaders and stepped up the brutal security crackdown in Oromia.
The deaths, mayhem and destruction were not inevitable. In hindsight, it is not too difficult to see how a measured, sensitive and less heavy-handed state response could have produced a different outcome.
By failing to institute an open and credible commission of inquiry into the death; coming out with inconsistent statements barely hours after the killings and arresting opposition leaders, the government simply reinforced mistrust and inflamed sentiments.
The government has since lifted the Internet ban and eased restrictions on movements. A semblance of normality is returning to many parts of Oromia. But tensions still remain high and ethnic relations increasingly toxic.
Much of the current tense and ominous standoff can be attributed to the series of missteps and kneejerk responses by the federal authorities.
The crisis in Oromia is emblematic of the inherent tensions, contradictions and disjuncture between two forms of politics – the “vernacularized” and the national.
But these factors, in themselves, cannot explain the speed at which the situation deteriorated. Even without Hachalu’s death and the violent aftermath, a showdown seemed inevitable. To understand why, an analysis of the wider context is necessary.
From Accommodation to Coercive Containment
The crisis in Oromia is emblematic of the inherent tensions, contradictions and disjuncture between two forms of politics – the “vernacularized” and the national.
Oromia offers a fascinating case study of how Abiy’s posture and calculations changed over time; how the evolution from a policy of accommodation to one of coercive cooptation and containment is feeding the current unrest.
PM Abiy inherited a dysfunctional state that had ran out of road and desperate for new direction. Years of rolling mass protests in Oromia and Amhara states had brought the nation to a political impasse.
The EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), once a strong and progressive party, had run out of steam and ideas; deeply riven by factionalism and power struggles. These divisions mirrored wider cleavages in society and the resurgence of competing ethno-nationalisms.
The economy was on the ropes, done by a combination of frenetic growth, expensive infrastructure modernization and unsustainable debt. The treasury barely had enough foreign reserves to cover a month’s worth of exports.
The challenges before the new PM were both complex and difficult. Over and above the onerous task of consolidating power, stabilizing the economy, reforming politics and putting the transition on a solid footing, PM Abiy had to grapple with the weight of public expectations.
Abiy’s administration in the first few months in office was characterized by a conspicuously Oromo theme. The premier ditched the suit for the flowing white cotton Oromo outfit. He treated visiting dignitaries to lavish banquets at which Oromo chefs laid out the finest of traditional cuisines. He gave away horses to special state guests.
This overt display of Oromo pride was deliberate and went down well in Oromia. Beyond winning the hearts and minds of his people, the strategy had potential to help him build a solid ethnic, regional support base, crucial in an ethnicized political system.
But to establish credibility and earn the trust of his Oromo ethnic group, the PM needed to do more. He released political prisoners among them prominent Oromo leaders. He appointed a record number of Oromos to key posts in the cabinet, the army and the security services. He unbanned the OLF, reached out to exiled activists and facilitated their return home.
Consolidating Oromo support proved more complicated for the PM. Despite his popularity, he had to contend with a diverse array of factions and personalities with local and national political ambitions, in some instances with large following and more influential.
Roots of Oromo Nationalism and Discontent
The Oromo are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, and make up roughly 40 million of Ethiopia’s population. They inhabit a vast geography and dispersed across much of south, central and western Ethiopia, as well as across the border in Kenya. Sub-families of the Oromo, such as the Boran, Gabra, Burji, and Orma live in the counties of Marsabit, Isiolo and Tana River.
This sheer demographic size did not translate into political and economic power. Their history has been one of marginalization and exploitation.
The large-scale uprisings in Ethiopia from 2014, largely driven by the Oromo, and which eventually thrust PM Abiy into power, made the Oromo a potent political force that cannot be ignored.
The Oromo are not monolithic. They are the most internally-diverse of Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities, with sub-groups differentiated by significant linguistic dialects, religious and cultural variations.
Religious pluralism, historically manifested in the peaceful cohabitation between different faith systems (Islam, Christianity and the ancestral faith, Waqqeffana), makes Oromo society the least prone to religious bigotry and militancy
These factors in turn inflect political dynamics and ways in which communities respond to political pressures. Dispersal over vast geographies, diversity and heterogeneity makes Oromo society uniquely pluralistic and least insular of the different nations. These traits have been a major source of strength but also weakness.
Religious pluralism, historically manifested in the peaceful cohabitation between different faith systems (Islam, Christianity and the ancestral faith, Waqqeffana), makes Oromo society the least prone to religious bigotry and militancy. It also explains why hardline strains of Salafi Islam has found Oromia unconducive to put down roots. This culture of tolerance is now under strain from Evangelical proselytism and encroachment.
Divisive political co-optation tactics by state and rival political factions feed off these rich diversity within Oromo society and drive much of the tensions and fragmentations we are seeing today in Oromia.
No subject polarizes Ethiopia today more than Oromo nationalism. The bloody violence and protests in the wake of Hachalu’s assassination have made the debate even more heated, emotive and divisive.
To understand the drivers of Oromo discontent and nationalism; untangle the underlying trends, dynamics and plot the potential future trajectory, it is critical for policy makers to widen their analytical lens and develop deeper contextual insights into its specificity.
Complexity
Oromo nationalism, not unlike other nationalisms, is complex and dynamic. It is fed by multiple streams, taps into a reservoir of potent, accumulated grievances and draws energy and sustenance from a rich repository of cultural memory and aspiration. The latter point is important, not least, because there is a misperception primarily/wholly driven by politics. In fact, the political manifestation of Oromo nationalism is fairly recent and comes off the back of decades of struggle for cultural freedoms. Key demands of the Oromo cultural revivalist movement included the right to accord Afaan Oromo same official privileges as Amharic and the freedom to openly observe traditional rituals (such as Irreecha). Pride in Oromo identity and need to affirm it inspired generations of young people. Hachalu was therefore the spokesman of this new generation; a proud, unapologetic and self-confident Oromo. His popular song Jirrastruck a chord because its lyrics encapsulated those aspirations in one simple and powerful line: We are here!
The current debate about Oromo nationalism comes against the backdrop of an increasingly febrile and polarized political climate. The language of discourse, reflecting these tensions, is emotionally charged and adversarial
It is worth bearing in mind all ethno-nationalisms are forms of myth-making, constructed around romanticized notions of the past, links with a self-defined ancestral homeland and impelled by powerful emotions.
Narrative
The current debate about Oromo nationalism comes against the backdrop of an increasingly febrile and polarized political climate. The language of discourse, reflecting these tensions, is emotionally charged and adversarial; much of the discussions, invariably, as simplistic as they are de-contextualized.
More disconcerting, public opinion is being shaped more and more by misperception – a narrative of mutual “othering” and demonization.
Current anti-Oromo sentiments are varied and cover a wide spectrum. The most dominant and least acute is a generalized fear of Oromo hegemony, sometimes laced with perception Oromos are violent-prone. This is especially the case among smaller ethnic groups that have borne the brunt of targeted violence.
The debate about the Oromo has assumed a reductionist dimension and dominated by essentialism – a tendency to ascribe a category of problematic and negative “essences” to the ethnic group and its politics.
This strain of Oromophobia is now largely driven by an amorphous group of old elites, loosely described as neftegna. The term is controversial and contested. The animating force of the neftegna ideology is a set of exaggerated “patriotic” ideas that revolve around the imperative to preserve Ethiopia as a single, strong, centralized state. The Christian character of the Ethiopian state, though less accentuated, forms an essential part of the narrative repertoire.
Oromo discontent in recent months have been inflamed by perception PM Abiy has bought into aspects of the neftegna narrative. Even if not true, the PM’s rhetorical appropriation of Ethiopiawinet (Ethiopianness) and the strident airplay it is getting on state media is polarizing. It is a divisive term; a throwback to the imperial age when it was instrumentalized to subject and control Oromos.
There is nothing exotic about Oromo nationalism and protest. The sense of alienation, disillusionment and grievances activists articulate have their roots in real material conditions. The primary engine feeds on long-festering socio-economic and political factors – massive unemployment, unequal wealth and income disparities, elite-driven land grabs, corruption and youth aspiration.
Ethno-Nationalism and Violence
There is no doubt that violent ethno-nationalism constitutes Ethiopia’s gravest threat, in the short to medium term.
The last two years saw a resurgence of volatile strains of ethnic identity politics in Ethiopia that ratcheted up inter-communal tensions and stoked violence.
The most serious of the conflicts were in Oromia-Somali Regional State (SRS) borders, Oromia-Afar regional state borders, the Guji Oromo-Gedeo community border areas, the Amhara-Gumuz regional state borders, the Oromo-Benishangul Gumuz regional state borders, and the Oromo special zones in Amhara region.
Hundreds were killed and the violence triggered waves of fresh displacements, one of the worst in the country’s history, bringing the number of IDPs to over 3 million in early 2019.
The upsurge in violence is not surprising. While much of it could be attributed to the disruptive power of Abiy’s speedy dismantling and opening up of the old state, subsequent state response played a significant role in compounding the crisis.
State-driven violence is a major contributor to localized violence in Oromia. Aggressive and hostile policing, mass arrest of activists, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of lethal force to quell protests have all combined to create a combustible environment of siege that stokes counter-violence.
That the worst fracturing of the Oromo is occurring in a state led by an Oromo PM is ironic, and, arguably, an indictment.
Oromo Fracture
Oromia is today more deeply divided and unstable than it has ever been in decades. The region is now both an incubator – generating destabilizing currents outward – and a barometer (to gauge the undercurrents of unresolved tensions in PM Abiy’s transition).
That the worst fracturing of the Oromo is occurring in a state led by an Oromo PM is ironic, and, arguably, an indictment. But before delving into the causes, two general pointers are worth noting.
First, Oromo politics was, and is, never monolithic. The region’s politics have always had a distinctly localized flavor, influenced, mostly, by a whole host of “structural” factors: strong sub-group loyalties and identities, geography and an inter-generational divide.
Second, a convergence of two powerful political homogenizing trends – one driven by national imperatives; the other by a “vernacularized” politics of resistance – aggravates the situation.
The multiple splits in Oromia (Gaanduumma) partly reflect old regional cleavages. In addition to the traditional rivallary between Wellega and Shewa elites, there is also an emerging three-way split, partly animated by existing regional identity politics but also stoked by intra-elite contestation: the Wollaga (where Lemma Megersa is from); Shewa (the seat of the Oromia regional state), and Jimma (home region of PM Abiy).
There is also a renewed attempt to exploit the Bale and Arsi and Shewa Oromos (the former predominantly Muslims while the later are mostly Orthodox Christians). Successive regimes, from Imperial Hailessellasie I, to Derg, and EPRDF, have worked hard to exploit this delicate tinderbox for the sole purpose of staying in power. But unlike in the past, in Abiy’s Ethiopia this constitutes a potentially dangerous fissure, in large part because it assumes religious dimensions and, likely, will stoke more sectarian tensions than before.
Abiy-Jawar Rivalry
The power struggle between PM Abiy Ahmed and Jawar Mohammed has in the last one year moved to the center of Oromia’s unsettled politics. The intensifying battle for supremacy between the two men is the single most potent wedge factor currently feeding intra-Oromo fragmentation.
PM Abiy and Jawar were not always adversaries. Jawar’s media outlets and influential social media presence was instrumental in fomenting and directing the popular protests that eventually catapulted Abiy to power. The two men fell out quickly after Jawar returned from exile, began building his own political base and turned into the premier’s most vocal critic, owing laregely to PM Abiy’s misplaced priorities.
Abiy and Jawar share a common interest. They have national leadership ambitions and desire to consolidate Oromo support ahead of the now deferred elections. A solid ethnic constituency is a great advantage in an ethnicized political system, but even crucial in competitive politics if it translates into votes.
Abiy and Jawar’s leadership styles are not too dissimilar. Both men are populists; relish playing to the gallery, have a penchant for exaggerated rhetoric and rely more on the sheer force of charisma to win supporters.
Jawar seems to enjoy significant advantage over Abiy in the contest for Oromo hearts and minds. His popularity has soared since he teamed up with Bekele Gerba, a widely respected Oromo politician to lead the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Unlike the PM, he is on the ground and not distracted by juggling competing priorities. He is more adept at grassroots politics and his “vernacularized” brand of politics has huge traction with a broad cross-section of Oromos disenchanted with state policies. This is especially true of the youth movement, Qeerroo.
More important, Jawar’s initiatives to repair Oromo divisions, intervene to ease localized tensions and conflicts endeared him to many Oromos. This contrasted with Abiy’s top-down approach and cooptation strategies that catalyzed divisions. The PM’s use of mass arrests, draconian security crackdowns to undermine Jawar’s support base have, so far, not only been unsuccessful, but also bred widespread resentment.
Their differences have progressively widened in recent months, but, whether it has solidified into an organic ideological and policy split, is debatable.
Editor’s Note: Rashid Abdi is a senior Horn of Africa specialist.
Federalism
The multinational federalism model in Ethiopia still remains hugely popular. Bigger nations see it as a system that protects their interests and privileges; the smaller ones as the only viable route out of marginalization.
Much of the disenchantment with the system in recent years is driven by perceptions it had become hollowed out, conferred no meaningful autonomy, bred its own inequities and stoked inter-ethnic tensions and violence. Yet, the preference, it would seem, of many, is reform, not dismantlement.
PM Abiy’s ambivalent and initial mild aversion to the federalism seems to have hardened – rhetorically, at least, in the last one year. The PM is instinctively a centralist and the recent lurch into the traditional default narrative of his predecessors did not come as surprise. There was always an implicit anti-federalism tenor to his rhetoric and a bias for a centralized state.
But what alienates Oromos more than the PM’s views on federalism is the strident patriotic messaging that now accompanies it – on the imperative for a united and strong law and order state. This type of discourse tends to be associated, rightly or wrongly, with the “assimilationist nationalism” of the past.
The prime minister’s dissenting views on the issue of the federalism seem not to have evolved much since 2018. In practice, his approach has shifted, somewhat. Whether due to electoral calculations, realism and political opportunism (understandable in an election year), he does appear more accommodating than many had expected.
The creation of Sidama Regional State, Ethiopia’s 10th federal state, in late 2019 may lend credence to this tentative “softening”, even though it is worth pointing out the process to establish the state has been in train for many years and involved a bloody battle even in post-Abiy Ethiopia .
PM Abiy’s anxiety about Jawar stems, partly, from awareness of his vulnerability on the multinational federalism arrangement. By being strong on federalism and making it a central plank of his national campaign, Jawar was in effect signaling intent to leverage his competitive advantage to the maximum.
Arrests
Jawar is loved and loathed in equal measure. Despite his huge popularity in Oromia, he has struggled to develop an appealing national profile and support base particularly among these who benefit from the largess of structural privilege in Ethiopia’s state building project. His critics continue to exploit some of his past careless rhetoric and links with the Qeerroo to paint him as a narrow ethno-nationalist bigot wedded to violence.
His potential to grow into a national leader and his electoral prospects ought not to be discounted. He was beginning to develop links with opposition groups beyond Oromia, particularly in the Southern regional state. Crucially, his strong focus on federalism attracted national attention and galvanized important ethnic constituencies.
The arrest and trial of Jawar, likely to last months (and possibly years if convicted), gives the Ethiopian PM the space and time, potentially, to reconfigure Oromo politics. This is a prospect almost certain to be complicated, if not fail.
First, Jawar’s popularity has not waned; if anything, it has increased. Second, the massive security clampdown and campaign of mass arrests of opposition activists and leaders has dented the PM and tilted Oromia into a less sympathetic political terrain.
OLF splits
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), its ambitions and brand of politics adds another volatile and complicated layer to the fractured politics and insecurity in Oromia. The ex-insurgency’s combatants and commanders returned home in September 2018 under a general amnesty and negotiations facilitated by Eritrea. A botched integration process served as the initial spark that ignited open dissent against the regional and national government. This quickly morphed into a low-grade conflict, pitting regional troops, supported by federal troops against armed factions of the OLF, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in late 2018.
A series of failed talks, peace pacts and mediation led by deeply-riven traditional Abba Gadaa councils between November 2018 to April 2019 tipped the stalemate into a full-blown crisis
The OLF’s swift transition from an ally of the Abiy government to adversary can be attributed to several factors. The amnesty deal negotiated in Asmara was vague and done in haste. Important issues were either overlooked or not properly addressed. As a result, trust broke down quickly. Disputes over the troop integration process and the latitude of political freedoms allowed the leadership soon became problematic wedge issues.
A series of failed talks, peace pacts and mediation led by deeply-riven traditional Abba Gadaa councils between November 2018 to April 2019 tipped the stalemate into a full-blown crisis and put the ex-insurgency on a fatal collision course with the federal government.
The decision by the OLF leader Dawud Ibsa to join other opposition politicians and the youth movement, Qeerroo, and coalesce around a common Pan-Oromo platform, under the umbrella of the Oromo Federalist Congress (led by Jawar Mohamed and Bekele Gerba) was deemed especially threatening to both regional and national governments.
In response, Addis deployed heavy firepower to subdue the OLF dissidents. This made a bad situation worse, fomented the further breakup of the OLF into small competing splinter factions, made engagement and peaceful settlement difficult and compounded the overall security situation.
Regional spillover
There is a regional dimension to the crisis in Oromia. A protracted and serious conflict in Oromia could spill over into much of northern Kenya. Oromia’s politics and conflict dynamics are closely intertwined with those of northern Kenya.
The immediate risk is massive displacement and a new humanitarian crisis in the Kenyan districts of Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo.
It is also likely that conflict fragmentation in Oromia could lead gradually to proliferation of armed criminal syndicates. There are already many armed smuggling syndicates operating on the border between Ethiopia and Kenya.
Kenya worries in particular about the possibility of Oromia’s serious rifts sowing divisions within sub-groups of its own large Boran population.
Recommendations
The crisis in Oromia is complex, serious, multi-layered; its causes and drivers varied. Left to fester it, certainly, will become intractable, result in large-scale violence and undo PM Abiy’s wobbly transition.
The federal government, the Oromia regional administration, traditional authorities, political parties and civil society need to take concerted and urgent action to defuse the crisis.
Below are some of the key areas where sensible and pragmatic policy interventions and change could make a big difference and mitigate risks:
Putting Oromo nationalism on benign course
Oromo nationalism is inflamed and risks becoming virulent. It feeds off Oromia’s mass disillusionment, acute grievances and multiple fracturing. But the single biggest aggravating factor risking to radicalize and put it on a violent course is state response (a self-fulfilling prophecy). To mellow Oromo nationalism, the following steps are worth considering:
Investing more in conflict resolution, peace-building
Ethiopia’s disappointing record in resolving and managing localized conflicts in Oromia highlights a number of crucial lessons. First, the state-driven, top-down conflict-resolution model is ineffective, often conflict-inducing. It bureaucratizes peacebuilding, diminishes local buy-in, sows social divisions and imposes unsustainable settlements.
Second, traditional councils of elders, when given sufficient autonomy and not coopted by the state, are the most effective agencies with credibility to mediate and resolve conflicts. To improve outcomes, the federal government ought to:
Ending state violence and repression
PM Abiy has turned the crisis in Oromia into a law and order problem. His pursuit of lethal force to suppress Oromo dissent, the draconian curbs on media freedom, Internet shutdowns, free expression and mass arrests have put the region and the whole country on a perilous course. Unless there is a fundamental shift in Abiy’s current posture and renewed efforts to promote pluralism, inclusivity, civil liberties, and dialogue in Oromia the situation will worsen. In concrete terms the government must:
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